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Abstract 
This paper examines the trend and pattern of violent crimes in Nigeria with a focus on the terrorist activities of 
Boko Haram. The paper traces the trend and pattern of violent crimes back to the 1980s and the emergence of 
Boko Haram whose pattern of criminal violence have taken very dangerous dimension and intensity in Nigeria. 
The saying is now making rounds that the fear of Boko Haram is the beginning of safety in Nigeria. This paper 
examines the origin, ideology, operational methods and the factors which have sustained the sect and made their 
pattern of criminality very destructive. The paper further discusses the challenges impeding government efforts 
in suppressing terrorism and other violent crimes in Nigeria. The paper holds the view that terrorism and violent 
crimes will continue to persist with much intensified acts of violence on the citizenry as long as government 
show lack of weakness and political will to arrest the situation. The paper concludes with recommendations for 
combating violent and terrorist acts in the country: a strict enforcement of terrorism laws, proper policing of our 
borders, provision of technological equipment and training of personnel, harmonization of intelligence amongst 
security agents, among others. 
Keywords: Trend, violent crime, Boko Harm, terrorist 
 
Introduction 
       In post Nigerian civil war, that is from early 1970s, there was observable upsurge of violent crimes and in 
the atrocious nature of these crimes particularly in the use of dangerous weapons and killings. By 1970, Decree 
No. 47, the first armed robbery decree was promulgated, which resulted in the public execution of some 
convicted armed robbers. It is sufficient to say that the Nigerian civil war of thirty months which spanned from 
1967 to 1970 provided the environment which facilitated the breed and indulgence in violent crimes by criminals.  
The national awareness and emergence of cult groups and increased violence can be traced back to the aftermath 
of this civil war. The roots of urban violence have also been attributed to the loss to traditional structures. This 
was asserted by Igbo (2007:158) when he said “the end of the civil war in January 1970 witnessed the emergence 
and widespread use of firearms in robbery”. The use of firearms gave great impetus to armed robbers and 
increased violent acts of criminality. 
      Consequently, related violent crimes including murder, rape, kidnapping, sea piracy added to armed robbery 
and cultism and of late militancy and terrorism  particularly as unleashed by the Boko Haram sect, joined forces 
to make the Nigerian nation apparently insecure. The escalation of violent crimes in Nigeria has been attributed 
to the proliferation of arms and ammunition in the hands of private individuals. This was confirmed by Okiro 
(2005) who laments that the proliferation of small arms also contributes to a culture of violence and a cycle that 
is difficult to break. Violence fuels insecurity; insecurity fuels violence.  
      More so, the hard economic times coupled with deteriorating standard of education and lack of specific 
training in areas relevant for sustaining both the agricultural and industrial sector have all contributed massively 
for the worsening insecurity and violence in the country. Also many youths went astray and incessant 
unpredictable political atmosphere, lack of progressive management of the economy led to galloping inflation 
and concentration of wealth in the hands of the few who were in positions of public authority. This situation 
fuelled sense of hopelessness and depression among the masses. It is significant that all the indices for violence 
were prevalent in the country which included high population explosion with its attendant unemployment, 
corruption, gross indiscipline among politicians, kidnapping, transborder crime, poor wages, poor living 
conditions, urban culture shocks and poor quality of management which manifested in crisis in the health care 
delivery, transportation, housing and employment. Rotberg (2002) would prefer to relate the above indices as 
signs of a weak and failed state. Ottaway and Mair (2004) observed that failing and failed states present  a grave 
danger to international stability as well as to the well-being of their populations, becuase they cannot provide 
security for their citizens or deliver essential goods (cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007). Hence, normlessness 
pervades the society leading to intense violence and insecuity. 
      It is on the podium of the above milieu that ethnic militia and militant groups like Movement for the Survival 
of Ogoni People (MOSOP), Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), and 
other militant groups like the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), Movement for the Emancipation 
of the Niger Delta (MEND), Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), Jukun Militia, 
Igbo People’s Congress (IPC),  Ijaw Militia, and Itsekiri Militia began to take advantage of deteriorating socio-
economic, cultural shock, political disharmony and infrastructural decay to cry out for recognition and against 
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marginalization (Guichaona, 2006; Onimajesin, 2011; Okechukwu, 2003). According to Agbaje (2002) the 
activities of this militia soon began to present a dangerous trend and dimension for the nascent democracy. 
       Most recently, the Boko Haram Islamic Fundamentalist group stepped into the arena of violence criminality, 
unleashing terror with impunity as a means of condemning the existing political and religious order in the 
country. Their activities became somewhat difficult to control due to the influence of foreign Islamic ideology 
which they have imbibed and which is found to be at variance with the Islamic doctrine being practiced by 
Muslims in Nigeria, hence the inability of Muslims and other Nigerians to reconcile the activities of Boko 
Haram with what they know about Islam. The group have become more vicious and unpredictable in their 
attacks with massive human casualties that government at the moment seem completely out of strategic measures 
to curtailing their violent acts. 
   Violent Crimes in Nigeria: Retrospective review  
       Crime can be seen as an infraction of both the basic principles of law and order and the norms of civilized 
behaviour. No society is immune from this thorny social problem but what differs is the frequency and 
magnitude of the situation and the response mechanisms to address same (Emeh, 2012). Moreover, crime is 
viewed as a conduct behaviour or an act which violates the criminal law or formal or written laws of a state for 
which a punishment is prescribed (Schmallenger, 2004; Terito, Halstaed, and Bromley, 2004; Adler, Mullier, 
and Laufer, 2001).  
     In the 1980s, crime wave grew to nearly pandemic proportions, particularly in Lagos and other urbanized 
areas characterized by rapid economic growth and change, stalk economic inequality and deprivation, social 
disorganization and by inadequate government service and law enforcement in capabilities (Emeh, 2012). 
Published crime statistics were probably grossly understated because most parts of the country were virtually un-
policed coupled with the issue of ‘dark figures’ (Igbo, 2007; Odekunle, 1981). Nigeria became caught in the web 
of crime dilemma which manifested in upsurge of both violent and non-violent crimes. The crimes grew from 
minor offences to robbery, murder, rape, cultism, Kidnapping, sea piracy and terrorism, thus generating a state of 
insecurity and threat to National security. According to Igbo (2000), violence appears to be the norm rather than 
the exception for armed robbery in Nigeria (cited in Igbo, 2007). 
     Most alarming and terrifying is the present escalation of violent crimes and the barbarity, lethality and trauma 
the perpetrators unleash on the hapless citizenry across the country. Notable in this regard are the rising incidents 
of armed robbery, assassination and ransom-driven kidnapping which are now ravaging the polity. So far, the 
prevalent increasing waves of violent crimes in Nigeria have questioned the political will on the part of the 
leaders and the capability of the law enforcement agencies in containing the challenges. In the past, armed 
robbers used to operate only in the night. But today, they operate both night and day, attacking homes, offices, 
banks, shops, restaurants and churches to rob, rape, maim and kill. They attack banks with dynamites, strike at 
filling stations and swoop on victims at traffic jams (Emeh, 2012; Ugwuoke, 2010; Igbo, 2007). Similarly, rape, 
sea piracy, cultism have taken sharp and increasing dimension in recent times. The increase rate of violent 
crimes of all categories in Nigeria is illustrated in tables 1 below: 
TABLE 1: CASES/OFFENCES REPORTED TO THE POLICE 1996-2000 
YEAR CASES CASES  CASES CASES       CASES 
REPORED REPORTED PROSECUTED PENDING    CLOSED 
AS % OF INVESTIGATION 
CASES 
REPORTED 
1996 258,655 92,237 35.7 132,047 13,020 
1887 234,992 100,284 2.7 104,831 11,004 
1998 217,553 94,898 43.6 96,065 9,626 
1,999 197,429 87,728 44 89,498 8,533 
2000 163,397 86,911 53.2 65,535 10,740 
SOURCE: The Nigeria Police Force (published in FOS, 2001:186) 
 
Table 2 is a summary of crimes from 1995 to 2003. A glance at the table shows an increasing trend of 
violent crimes across the country. For example, in 2002 armed robbery cases increased from 3271 to 3497 in 
2003 about 6.5 percent (226). This trend was sustained in subsequent years especially in 2008 (See table 3 
below), and as reported for Lagos State in 2011 by the State Commissioner of Police. 
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TABLE 2:         CRIMES IN NIGERIA (1995-2003 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Murder
 1585 1561 1730 1688 1766 1871 2120 2283 2136 
Attemted Murder
 321 307 250 248 244 243 253 280 233 
Manslaughter
 25 21 18 27 14 27 15 14 6 
Grievious harm/wounding
 16300 17650 14720 14440 16730 14168 15351 17761 17666 
Hssault
 46543 52747 42815 40847 37044 35000 37691 32492 17666 
Rape/indecent dressing
 2346 2198 2585 2265 2451 2234 2285 2201 2253 
Kidnapping
 415 373 377 282 356 357 354 369 410 
Armed robbery
 2109 2419 2181 2291 2422 2953 2925 3271 3497 
Arson
 1240 1002 1190 1135 1291 1007 908 1539 1499 
SOURCE: The Nigeria Police Abstract of Crime statistics (1995-2003) as cited by Ugwuoke (2010:190-
191) 
 
TABLE 3: COMPARATIVE TABLE ON GENERAL INFORMATION 
ABOUT ARMED ROBBRY 2007-2008 
OFFENCES                                                                              2007                        2008 
No. of Armed Robbers                                                              2,316                       2,340 
No. of Policemen Killed by Armed Robbers                               101                          110 
No. of Persons Arrested                                                            4,109                       3,423 
No. of Persons Prosecuted for Armed Robbery                           715                      2, 026 
No. of Cases/persons A/trail                                                      1,442                      2,026 
No. of Police Killed on Official Duty other than A/Robbery     201                       ------ 
No. of Civilian killed by Armed Robbers                                    259                         133 
No. of Policemen injured by Armed Robbers                              239                           26 
No. of Expatriate killed & Injured by Armed Robbers                 - -                        ------ 
No. of Robbers killed by the Police                                             462                         857 
No. of Armed Robbers Injured by the Police                                38                           53 
No. of Civilians injured by Armed Robbers                                 57                           19 
Cases Pending Investigation.                                                      1,252                      109 
SOURCE: CLEEN FOUNDATION, 2010 
        In a Press Release and briefing by the Lagos State Commissioner of Police, Mr. Yakubu Alkali recently, he 
admitted that there was a rise in robbery incidents in Lagos State. He gave the summary of crime statistics of 
2010 and 2011. According to him, in 2010 there were 48 cases of armed robbery in 2010 as against 61 in 2011. 
There were 204 cases of murder in 2010 as against 319 in 2011. The number of civilians killed by armed robbers 
in 2010 was given as 124 as against 164 killed in 2011 while the number of policemen killed between 2007 and 
September 2011 was given as 124 (Ugbodaga, 2011). The implication is that there was significant upsurge of 
crime in 2011 as against 2010 with great human casualties. 
        Nevertheless, the emergence of Boko Haram has over-shadowed these other violent crimes as if they never 
existed due to its violent nature, terrorism and state of constant fear it has ingrained in the lives of the citizenry. 
This has given impetus to a popular saying in the security arena that ‘the fear of Boko Haram is the beginning of 
safety’. This because the name of Boko Haram is currently synonymous with bomb blasts, terrorism, massacre 
of innocent citizens, destruction of churches and all that stand against peace and stability (Chinwokwu, 2012a). 
“The socio-psychological effect this fear has generated on the people is better imagined than said” (Chinwokwu, 
2012b:47). 
Evaluation of Boko Haram 
        Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad translated as people committed to the propagation of the 
Prophet’s teachings and Jihad popularly known in its Hausa name as Boko Haram, is an Islamic fundamentalist 
organization (that has metamorphosis into a dreaded terrorist group) based in the North East Zone of Nigeria in 
the areas predominated by the Kanuri ethnic group. It was alleged to have been founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 
2002. The organization is a Muslim sect that seeks to abolish the secular system and establish an Islamic state, as 
well as establish Sharia system of government in the country. The sect Boko Haram translated as “Western 
education is sacrilege” or “Western education is a sin” is divided into three factions and in 2012, was responsible 
for more than 950 killings in Nigeria (Wikipedia, 2012). 
       The group became known internationally following the sectarian violence in 2009. It does not have a clear 
structure or evident chain of command. Though it is a debatable subject if Boko Haram has any links with 
terrorist outfits outside Nigeria, however, some claim that one of its factions maintains link with the terror 
groups in Somalia, North Africa and Al-Qaeda. The late Muammar Gaddafi of Libya hinted in 2010 that there 
were Al-Qaeda cells in Nigeria. Furthermore, the State Security Services alleged that a member of the Boko 
Haram recently came back from Somalia to oversee the attack of the UN Office Abuja – Nigeria 
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(http://www.economist.com/21528307). 
Etymology and Ideological Base 
      In Maiduguri, where the group was formed in 2002, the residents dubbed it ‘Boko Haram’, which comes 
from the Hausa word ‘Boko’ meaning “Western education” and the Arabic word ‘Haram’ figuratively meaning 
“sin” (literally ‘forbidden’). Literally, Boko Haram means “Western education is forbidden”. The group earned 
this name due to its notoriety and  strong opposition to anything ‘Western’, which it sees as corrupting Muslims 
(Wikipedia, 2012).. 
     Boko Haram is an indigenous Salafist group which only turned itself into a Salafist Jihadist group in 2009. 
(Salafism) is an Islamic fundamentalist movement associated with Wahhabism. The sect in its radical form 
emphasizes strict interpretation of religious texts and opposition to non-Islamic influences. It propagates a 
version of Islam that not only forbids any interaction with the Western world, but is also against the traditional 
Muslim establishment and the government of Nigeria. Furthermore, it promotes a version of Islam which makes 
it sinful for Muslims to take part in any political or social activity associated with western society, for instance, 
voting in election, wearing skirts, trousers or reading a secular book or attending secular education (Chothia, 
2011). For this group anything representing Western culture and civilization should be rejected by the Muslims. 
The group publicly extols its ideology despite the fact that its founder and former leader, Mohammed Yusuf was 
himself a highly educated man who lived an extravagant life and drove a Mercedes Benz. It is an irony that those 
who speak maliciously of Western culture live all their lives enjoying the very things they preach against. 
      It is fascinating to note that members of the group do not interact with local Muslim population and have 
carried out assassinations in the past of anyone who criticizes it, including Muslim clerics. In a 2009 BBC 
interview, Yusuf, then leader of the group rejected scientific explanation being the cause for rain, the theory of 
evolution and the earth being a sphere, if it runs contrary to the teachings of Allah. Before his death, Yusuf 
reiterated the group’s objective of changing the current education system and rejecting democracy. 
     It is also remarkable to note that everybody including Muslims and Christians has condemned the group’s 
violent activities which they have described as inhuman and dastardly. Dr. Mu’azu Babangida Aliyu, the Niger 
State Governor has criticized the group stating that “Islam is known to be a religion of peace and does not 
condone violence and crime in any form”. And Boko Haram does not represent Islam. Also, Abubakar Sa’adu, 
the Sultan of Sokoto, has called the sect “anti-Islam” (http:/allafrica.com/view/an-ambassador-to-islam/). 
A Historical Background of Boko Haram 
       Before colonization and subsequent invasion of the British Empire, the territory where Boko Haram is 
currently active, was a sovereign constitutional republic or Sultanate with a majority of Kanuri Muslim 
population. It was a Sultanate that was governed in line with the principles of the constitution of Medina. The 
Bornu Empire, also known as Bornu Sultanate was quite distinct from that of the Sokoto Caliphate of the 
Hausa/Fulani ethnic group. The Bornu Sultanate of the Kanuri, spring out after the overthrow of the older 
Kanem-Bornu Empire ruled by the Saifawa dynasty for over 2000 years. The Saifawa are the longest ruling 
dynasty in recorded history. 
     After the conquest of Bornu Sultanate in 1903, the British, who were predominantly Christians; introduced a 
new educational system which found little appeal among the local population. This crystallized increased 
dissatisfaction and gave rise to many fundamentalist among the Kanuri and other tribes of the North-East Nigeria 
(Onwubiko, 1967). 
      One of the most famous of such fundamentalist was Mohammed Marwa (alias Maitatsine) who was at the 
height of his notoriety during the 1970s and 1980s. He was sent into exile by the British authorities. He refused 
to believe Mohammed was a Prophet and scheme riots in the country which resulted in the death of thousands of 
people. Some analysts view Boko Haram as an off-shoot of the Maitatsine Islamic fundamentalist, although with 
some ideological modifications. As a rule, the Hausa/Fulani do not believe in the teachings of Mohammed 
Marwa and that was why they dubbed him “Maitatsine” meaning the “accursed one”.   
     The Boko Haram group was founded by a self-proclaimed Nigerian spiritual leader, Mohammed Yusuf 
(1970-2009) in 2002 in the city of Maiduguri with the aim of establishing a Sharia Government in Bornu State 
under former Ali Modu Sheriff. He established a religious complex that included a mosque and a school where 
many poor families from across Nigeria and from neighbouring countries enrolled their children. It is important 
to know that the kind of school established by Yusuf is that which will have appeal for the teeming Almajiri 
youths. This social outcast that have no place they call their home, or parents to be identified with will be most 
grateful for somebody who offers them a home, food, clothing and other social comfort. This forms the main 
reason they remain easy tools in the North that can be manipulated to foment acts of violence. Thus, Yusuf and 
his school had ulterior political motive which soon manifested in the use of the place as recruitment ground for 
future Jihadist to fight the state. The group also includes members who come from neighbouring Chad and Niger 
Republics and speaks only Arabic. In 2004, the complex was relocated to Yusuf’s home state of Yobe in the 
village Kanamma near the Niger border (Wikipedia, 2012).  
Operational Methods and the Emergence of Boko Haram Outrage 
       Boko Haram group conducted its operations more or less nocturnally and peacefully during the fi
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years of its lifespan. However, this was truncated in 2009 when the Nigerian government initiated an 
investigation into the group’s activities following alleged reports that its members were building up arms in 
anticipation or preparation for an attack on the people or government. Before this time, it had been muted in 
security circles that government were privileged to security intelligence reports indicating that the group was 
subversive in its formation; but government reportedly ignored the warnings provided by the security agencies 
about the militant character and organization of the group. This perceptible disinterest of government in the 
activities of the sect may have been informed from the fact that the sect assisted the ruling party in the state of 
Bornu to ascend to the throne. As a result of this obvious fact, their activity was not considered inimical or threat 
to the peace of the state. 
         However, when Government commenced clampdown action on the sect in 2009, several members of the 
group were arrested in Bauchi, sparking off deadly clashes leading to the death of over seven hundred (700) 
people. During the hostility with the security forces, Boko Haram fighters reportedly used fuel “laden 
motorcycles” and “bows with poisoned arrows” to attack a police station. The group leader’s father was killed 
during the fight while the leader Mohammed Yusuf was arrested and taking to the police station for detention. 
Mohammed Yusuf was later killed by the police in cold blood while in their lawful custody.  The news of 
Yusuf’s death sparked off various condemnations from human right groups across the world. After Yusuf’s 
death, a new leader emerged whose identity is still not known to the government. Government action in the extra 
judicial killing of Yusuf was a misguided course, in some cases the theory of removing the arrow head in order 
to quell a dissident group does not necessarily lead to the death of the group, instead it further harden the tenacity 
of the group to carry on with the course of their dead leader. That is the case of Boko Haram and many other 
militant or dissident groups across the globe. 
      Consequent upon the killing of Yusuf, the group carried out its first terrorist attack in Bornu State in January, 
2010 which resulted in the death of four (4) people. Since then, the violence has escalated in frequency, intensity 
and ferocity with massive human casualty as illustrated in table 4 below: 
TABLE 4: SOME CASES OF VIOLENCE CAUSED BY BOKO HARAM 
S/NO. DATE INCIDENCE 
1. 7/9/2010 Bauchi Prison attack in which about 721 inmates were released including 123 Boko Haram 
members  
2. December, 
2010 
Bomb attack in Zuba an out-skits of Abuja  
3. 24/12/2010 Multiple bomb attacks in Jos, Plateau  State killing over 38 people 
4. 31/12/2010 Bomb attacks  at Mugadishi Barracks, Abuja killing over 32 people 
5. 22/4/2011 Bomb attacks on the INEC Office Suleja, Niger State killing 14 people. 
6. 22/4/2011 Boko Haram frees 14 Prisoners during a jail break in Yola, Adamawa State  
7. 29/5/2011 Various attacks in different cities of Northern Nigeria killing over 20 persons 
8. 16/6/2011 Police Headquarters bomb attacks in Abuja killing 3 persons 
9. 26/6/2011 Bombing attack on a beer parlour in Maiduguri 
10. 10/7/2011 Bombing at the All Christian Fellowship Church in Suleja, Niger State. 
11. 11/7/2011 The University of Maiduguri was temporarily closed down due to violence and insecurity. 
12. 12/8/2011 A Prominent Muslim cleric Liman Bama was shot dead by Boko Haram. 
13. 26/8/2011 UN Office at Abuja was attacked by a suicide bomber killing 23 lives. 
14. 5/11/2011 Bomb attack at Damaturu, Yobe State. 
15. 25/12/2011 Multiple bomb attacks at St. Theresa Catholic Church, Madalla, near Suleja Niger State killing over 
43 persons. 
16. 20/1/2012 Multiple bomb attacks of government facilities including the Zonal Police Headquarters, SSS, 
Immigration offices in Kano city, Kano state killing over 150 persons.  
17.  8/3/2012 Boko Haram killed two Westerners – a Briton and Italian Engineers who were kidnapped by the 
Sect eight months ago in Sokoto. 
18. 11/3/2012 St. Finbar’s Catholic Church near government house, Jos Plateau State was attacked by a Boko 
Haram suicide bomber killing 11 persons and injuring over 22 others. 
19 29/4/2012 The Islamic Fundamentalist group Boko Haram launched a multiple bomb attacks on a worship 
centre located inside the Bayero University, Kano killing over seven people. 
20 10/6/2012 Boko Haram suicide bomber attacked Christ Chosen Church of God, Rukuba Road in Jos – Plateau 
state and killed over 15 worshippers.  
21 10/6/2012 Boko Haram gun men attacked church worshippers in Biu Bornu State and killed 3 persons and 
injured many persons. 
22 28/10/ 2012  St. Rita's Catholic church in the Malali village, Kaduna Nigeria was attacked by Boko Haram 
suicide bomber who drove a vehicle packed with explosives into the church during Sunday Mass, 
killing about 8 people and injuring over 100 persons including children.  
Sources: Authors compilation 
     Today, the group has graduated from using motorcycle to lift its improvised explosive devices (IED) which 
are detonated at the targets, to the use of cars including Hilux Van to carry bombs with jerry cans of fuel to 
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launch attacks on its target. The group has also intensified its dangerous pattern and dimension by the use of 
suicide bombers and foreign terrorists from Niger and Chad Republics. The group has further added another 
dimension in their operations by kidnapping and killing foreign nationals thereby given it an international 
outlook. 
Factors That Enhanced the Growth of Boko Haram 
        The factors that facilitated the emergence of Boko Haram can be viewed in three major dimensions. These 
include political, religious and economic factors but this is not exhaustive of the factors. 
       Politically, the group originally had a political goal of establishing Sharia states in the North as different 
from the secular system in the country. According to Chothia (2011) its political goal was to create an Islamic 
state, and school, and the school was to become a recruitment ground for Jihadist to fight the state. Consequently, 
they received tacit support unmindful of the consequences and effect. This was done through the payment of ten 
Million Naira (#10m) annually to the group. The demand and introduction of Sharia in some Northern States of 
Nigeria was in line with the political agitations of the group. As long as government fulfilled their promise to 
them in terms of Islamizing the North and paying their regular stipend, the group was to remain loyal to the 
ruling party. However, the love romance which existed between government and the sect became sour, as 
government tactically and strategically began to withdraw their support and payment to the group. Perhaps the 
sponsors from the government circle did not envisage the dimension of their operation and the outcome of their 
refusal to stick to the earlier agreement with them.  
       In the Religious dimension, the group is a fundamentalist and an extremist breed who do not want any 
adulteration of Islam by any Western standard or influence. Hence, at the inception, they had no appeal for the 
educational system of the west which is operated in Nigeria. Secondly, they were also not comfortable with the 
traditional Islamic set up due to the level of teaching they have imbibed from their foreign collaborators. Their 
kind of religious ideology was a return to pure golden age, where there was zero tolerance for any other religion. 
Even Muslims who disagree with their religious principle was regarded as anti-Islam. Thus they crush Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike with impunity without remorse. 
    The Economic dimension stemmed from their level of illiteracy which prevented them from appreciating the 
plunder in governance which instead of enhancing their well-being, they made do with funds paid to them. Since 
they were allergic to schooling in Western culture other than Arabic studies, there was penury. The level of 
poverty was heightened by their lack of skills and they are equally unemployable. Though a few of their leaders 
are educated, most of them are not, and so are susceptible and easily persuaded so long as it is in line with 
extremist doctrine. The unfortunate thing is their ignorance in recognising the double standard of their leaders, 
who preaches against western education and yet is enmeshed in the use of all that is Western for their comfort – 
internet, media, vehicles, radios, arms, clothing, food etc.   
Sources of Funds: 
     The sources of funds of Boko Haram are not different from that of terrorism financing. When the group 
started each member was tasked to contribute one Naira daily to which they were committed and dedicated. 
Other sources include 
Farming: - The group engaged in extensive farming and sell the proceeds for fund. 
Trading: - Their counterparts outside the shores of this country send goods to them which they sale to raise 
money for the group. 
  Robbery: - They engaged in extensive robbery in the North Eastern part of the country including cattle rustling. 
Armed Robbery: - Including bank robbery with which to fund the family of their suicide bombers. 
Harassment: intimidation and extortion of those they appreciate to be reasonably wealthy; and funds from 
foreign sponsors. 
Foreign Aids: - Boko Haram is believed to have links with Islamic fundamentalist groups like Al-Qaeda, Al-
Shabab of Somalia and with countries like Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, Lebanon and Palestine. It is obvious that 
apart from the human capital being trained by these groups and in those countries, financial aids are also 
provided which gave Boko Haram the impetus to have access to exotic cars which are immediately put into use 
in their suicide attacks. 
Local Support: The President of Nigeria, Dr. Goodluck Jonathan hinted to the Nigerian people of the infiltration 
of the sect in his government. The implication is that Boko Haram is not alone. There are people, in fact very 
highly placed Nigerians who provide the leverage backbone on which the sect relaxes on for financial and moral 
support. Okunaya (2011) spoke of cosmic symbols which predict that if Nigerian politicians make peaceful 
change impossible, they will make violent revolution inevitable. We feel that it is this kind of people who have 
made Boko Haram invincible and unyielding. Boko Haram is not driven by ignorance, poverty or unemployment, 
rather they are driven by people whose voracity and avaricious nature refuse them from seeing that power 
belongs to God and it is in his hand to decide whom to give it. It is therefore this ‘power thirsty’ individuals that 
have encouraged, maintained and sustained the needs of the group using them as bargaining power to launch 
themselves into political relevance in the political governance in the country. 
Dilemmas in Combating the Terrorist Group 
Journal of Culture, Society and Development- An Open Access International Journal 
Vol.3 2014 
 
14 
 
1. Lack of political will by those in government who may be apparently sympathizing with them due 
to religious or other sentiments. 
2. Allegation of compromise by senior officers of security agencies who are on the payroll of Boko 
Haram. Consequently, they frustrate information and investigation process about the group. 
3. Lack of maximum implementation of the anti-terrorism law. 
4. Lack of information and co-operation from the members of the public, especially in the North 
regarding the activities of the Boko Haram sect 
5. Inability of security agencies to penetrate the group due to their faceless nature. 
6. Lack of loyalty to the President among government principals officials who have been alleged of 
being in sympathy with Boko Haram. 
7. Religion and culture seem to play the greatest obstacle in combating the menace of Boko Haram. 
Government action must often are misinterpreted to mean marginalization, disfavour, oppression or 
domination of one religion or culture over others. 
Assessment of Boko Haram Terrorist Outrage 
      Boko Haram is considered to be a major potential terrorist threat affecting Nigeria’s internal security and 
other countries. United States officials believe it is potentially allied with AI-Qaeda. United States Africa 
Commander (AFRICOM), Commander General Carter F. Ham stated in September 2011, that three (3) 
African terrorist groups including al-Shahab of Somalia, AI-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb across the Sahel 
region and Boko Haram have very explicitly and publicly voiced an intent to target westerners, and the US 
specifically and that he was concerned with “the voiced intent” of the three (3) organizations would result in 
more closely collaborations and synchronizing of their efforts (Gambrell, 2012). 
     Gambrell (2012) went on to report in Associated Press that General Ham reiterated his concern after the 
Christmas Day 2011 bombing of St. Theresa Catholic Church, Madalla near Suleja in Niger State and stated 
he was greatly concerned about their stated intent to connect with AI-Qaeda senior leadership most likely 
through AI-Qaeda in the lands of Islamic Maghreb. A bipartisan US congressional counter terrorism panel 
urged the Obama Administration and US intelligence community in November 2011 to focus on Boko 
Haram as a potential threat to United State territory.  
       Similarly, the then National Security Adviser (NSA), General Owoye Andrew Azazi, was working with 
other African Government, European and Middle Eastern Governments, and the US Government to build 
cooperation against Boko Haram. He met in 2010 with the Criminal Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director, 
Leon Panetta and in 2011 with AFRICOM Commander, General Ham and other US officials and was in the 
US when the congressional panel was preparing its report on Boko Haram. He participated in a CIA 
conference at about the same time. After the Christmas 2011 bombings carried out by Boko Haram, 
President Barack Obama’s office issued a statement that confirmed that United States and Nigeria were 
cooperating at a senior level against the terrorist group. The Israelis government and France have given their 
words to collaborate with Nigerian government in combating the scourge of Boko Haram. 
      The Federal Government instituted a panel headed by Ambassador Usman Gaji Galtimari to find out 
what the group actually wanted in order to make way for dialogue. They rebuffed such entreaties while 
maintaining a vengeful stance for their slain leader Mohammed Yusuf. They have recently asked 
government to release all their members held in various prisons for acts of terrorism, as a condition for 
dialogue with them. The group’s strategy of liaising with Somalia to perfect their terrorist campaign is an 
indication of non-compromise with their plans and ideology. The group seem not to be in a hurry to 
surrender their arms, although the Northern leaders in a recent meeting with the Sultan of Sokoto told the 
group enough was enough. In a most unbecoming of a government, it seems Boko Haram dictates the terms 
of dialogue instead of government marshalling to them the riot act. 
       It would also be recalled that Boko Haram became manifest in 2002 during President Olusegun 
Obasanjo regime, when Northern governors clamoured for the implementation of Sharia law in the states. 
Consequently, Boko Haram was fancied by the governors to be an Islamic police for the implementation of 
Sharia, possibly without due consideration of the aftermath of such outfit. It was further alleged that the 
Governors were funding them with annual subvention of Ten Million Naira (#10M). Later, Isa Yuguda of 
Bauchi State reduced the fund to Five Million Naira ((#5M) annually. 
      Boko Haram grievances came to the peak when most of the Governors stopped paying them. It was 
alleged that they warned Governor Kwankwaso severally before the onslaught of attack unleashed in Kano 
on 20
th
 January, 2012. They also alleged that the present Governor of Bornu State facilitated the 
apprehension of their spokesman by the State Security Service. It would be recalled that Kabiru Umar (Alias 
Kabiru Sokoto) was first arrested in the Bornu State Governor’s guest house in Abuja before his escape 
from the Police. 
      In the event of non-implementation of Sharia in the Northern States, and not being used to enforce the 
law, the bottled up grievances against the State has manifested in the present situation whereby the 
government and state became their target, as seen in their fight against the political outfit of Governor Modu 
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Sheriff (ECOMOG) and the state government outfit code named Operation Flush (OPS FLUSH). 
Recommendations 
    A number of steps aimed at solving the problem such as creating a special joint military task force to 
eliminate Boko Haram, installing numerous closed circuit televisions (CCTV) throughout the Federal 
Capital Territory, Abuja and appointment of a new National Security Adviser have proved ineffective in 
suppressing terrorism and other violent crimes in Nigeria.  The country has rather witnessed intense tension, 
fear and insecurity, to the extent that nobody know their next victim or where, how and when they will 
strike.  There is actual great fear in the land. The following are recommended:- 
a) Government should ensure the law on terrorism is enforced to the letter without show of sentiment. The 
Criminal justice system especially the police and the court must relegate sentiment and allow the full 
weight of the law to be meted to all offenders equally according to the Act. 
b) The security of our country’s borders should be reviewed to ensure alll the nooks and crannies of the 
country’s land borders through which aliens can enter the country are properly policed with structures 
and equipment emplaced with the immigration and customs and other security officials stationed there, 
to screen immigrants and emigrants accordingly.  
c) The government should put in place emergency measures requisite to quell a violent revolution 
including reducing such areas of discontent that could be capitalized by disgruntled elements like 
unemployment, corruption, and infrastructural development relation to power, roads and refineries as 
well as empowering the security forces to nip such a revolution in the bud.  
d) The security agencies should be equipped and trained with modern technological gadgets for detecting 
bombs among others, as well as encourage them with life insurance policy that will motivate them to 
take the risk of dying for the unity and security of the nation. 
e) The media should be used to manage the perception of the people using the local language people can 
understand very well; and 
f) Good governance based on rule of law, justice and equality, freedom and liberty are keys to neutralizing 
any insurrection, insurgency, subversion and terrorism. Government must strive to remove all indices of 
corruption and injustice and ensure the dividends of democracy reaches all citizens irrespective of 
social status.  
g) Security agencies should harmonize their operations to form a strong synergy whereby information are 
effectively shared and utilized for efficient security service delivery. They should be a centralizing unit 
to coordinate security intelligence for maximization of information and operational efficiency. 
 
Conclusion: 
     The act of violence and terrorism being experienced in our country does no one good, rather the country is 
degenerating as a pariah nation soon to be abandoned as people move out in droves as a result of general 
insecurity. After a decade of violence, the government still does not have an effective strategy for dismantling 
the group. The terrorist organization preys on the disillusioned Muslims of the North, who are fed up with 
corruption, poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and lack of economic opportunities. Unless this changes, the 
audacity of Boko Haram attack will continue to hunt the government.  The current announcement of the group to 
seize fire in order to enter into negotiation with government is good. But government must provide the terms of 
peace and must negotiate with the real leaders of the group and surrogates. 
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